




FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS MEASURED AT FAIR 




















A THESIS SUBMITTED 
 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING 
















I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by 
me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information 
which have been used in the thesis. 
 





















It is my pleasure to express my sincere appreciation to those who has given me 
continuous help and support for this thesis. I would like to thank my family 
members for their love during my entire PhD life. I am indebted to my 
supervisor, Oliver Zhen Li, for his invaluable guidance, encouragement, and 
support. I am also grateful to my committee members: Edmund Keung and 
Bin Miao for sharing their insights and time with me. I would also like to 
thank workshop participants at National University of Singapore for their 




Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1 
2. Background, Literature and Hypotheses ............................................................... 7 
2.1. Financial instruments measured at fair value ................................................. 7 
2.2. Taxation of financial instruments .................................................................. 9 
2.3. Incentives and disincentives of tax aggressiveness ...................................... 10 
2.4. Fair value hierarchy and tax aggressiveness ................................................ 12 
2.5. The effect of corporate governance ............................................................. 14 
2.6. The effect of product market power ............................................................. 15 
2.7. The effect of geographic dispersion ............................................................. 16 
2.8. The effect of financial constraint ................................................................. 17 
3. Data, Variable Construction, and Descriptive Statistics ..................................... 18 
3.1. Data and sample selection ............................................................................ 18 
3.2. Variable construction ................................................................................... 19 
3.3. Descriptive statistics .................................................................................... 23 
4. Empirical Results ................................................................................................ 24 
4.1. Financial instruments and tax aggressiveness .............................................. 24 
4.2. Corporate governance, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness ........... 28 
4.3. Product market power, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness........... 29 
4.4. Geographic dispersion, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness .......... 30 
4.5. Financial constraint, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness .............. 31 
4.6. Fair value hierarchy and tax lobbying .......................................................... 33 
5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 34 
References ............................................................................................................... 36 
Appendix A ............................................................................................................. 40 
Appendix B ............................................................................................................. 41 








We examine the association between financial instruments from different 
levels of fair value hierarchy and tax aggressiveness. Using (1) four effective 
tax rate measures, and (2) firms’ tax lobbying expenditures to proxy for tax 
aggressiveness, we find consistent results that level 2 and level 3 financial 
instruments are associated with more tax aggressiveness while level 1 
instruments do not exhibit such a pattern. The magnitude of the effect on tax 
aggressiveness increases from level 1 to level 3 instruments. We also find that 
the association between financial instruments and tax aggressiveness is more 
pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance, greater product market 
power, more geographic dispersion, or increased financial constraints. We 
show that tax aggressiveness associated with instruments differs across the 
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The past few decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the use 
and the variety of financial instruments. Despite economic benefits that 
financial instruments have brought about, challenges also arise on how to 
tax these instruments effectively. Financial innovations give rise to tax 
reduction strategies that can eliminate substantial amounts of capital 
income from the tax base. For example, financial instruments would allow 
taxpayers to convert high taxed returns into low taxed ones, accelerate 
losses from depreciated assets and defer gains from appreciated ones, and 
circumvent rules designed to ensure the taxation of capital income. Facing 
these issues, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, 
Dave Camp, released a proposal on reforming the taxation of financial 
products in 2013. As part of the comprehensive tax reform, the proposal 
involved an important change that will subject all derivative instruments 
to mark-to-market taxation and tax resulting gains and losses as ordinary 
income. The mark-to-market system makes the taxation process more 
transparent to observe, increasing the difficulty for firms to shelter 
income. 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (SFAS No. 
157), Fair Value Measurements, classifies financial assets and liabilities 
into a three-level hierarchy based on the observability of inputs. According 
to SFAS No. 157, level 1 inputs are directly observable from quoted prices 
of identical assets or liabilities in active markets. Level 2 inputs are 
indirectly observable, which are based on quoted prices of similar 
instruments traded in active markets, identical instruments traded in 
inactive markets, or other market-related data. Level 3 inputs are most 
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unobservable, which involve a large quantity of assumptions based on 
managers’ estimates. Therefore, level 1 estimates are mark-to-market, 
level 2 estimates adjusted mark-to-market, and level 3 estimates mark-to-
model, respectively. Financial instruments measured using level 1 inputs 
(level 1 instruments thereafter) have a more transparent valuation 
method and thus a lower level of managerial discretion and information 
asymmetry than level 2 and level 3 instruments. Actively traded in the 
market, level 1 instruments comprise investments that are bought and 
held for selling in the near term. The resulting gains and losses are 
included in taxable income rapidly, resulting in a more volatile income 
figure. An increase in income volatility results in more income taxes as 
firms face an increasing marginal statutory tax rate (Smith and Stulz 
1985). Higher income volatility also reduces debt capacity, with less tax 
deductible interest expenditures (Leland 1998). Further, the complexity in 
nature and ambiguity in taxation of level 2 and level 3 instruments 
subject them to greater managerial discretion, leaving plenty of room for 
managers to engage in tax aggressive activities. Based on the above 
arguments, level 2 and level 3 instruments are associated with more tax 
aggressiveness than level 1 instruments. 
On the other hand, fair value measurement affects the carrying 
value of instruments, creating temporary differences and deferred taxes 
and thereby influencing firms’ effective tax rates. Since level 1 
instruments introduce more volatile market pricing, they will exert a 
larger impact on the effective tax rates. Moreover, one may argue that an 
active external market enables firms to strategically time the selling of 
level 1 instruments to either defer gains or recognize losses. If these 
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arguments hold, level 1 instruments are associated with more tax 
aggressiveness. 
Employing a sample of U.S. non-financial firms in 2008-2014, we 
find that firms with more instruments classified under fair value assets 
are more tax aggressive, while fair value liabilities contribute little to the 
reduction of effective tax rates. In examining different levels of fair value 
assets, level 2 and level 3 assets are negatively associated with all the 
effective tax rate measures, while level 1 assets are associated with only 
one measure. Comparing the magnitude of marginal reduction in effective 
tax rates, we find consistent results that level 2 and level 3 assets are 
associated with greater tax aggressiveness compared with level 1 assets. 
The results suggest that firm can use more level 2 or level 3 instruments, 
but not level 1 instruments, to reduce their effective tax rates. 
To examine whether and how the association between assets from 
different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax aggressiveness varies with 
firm characteristics, we conduct cross-sectional analyses based on the 
following factors: corporate governance, product market power, geographic 
dispersion, and financial constraint. Corporate governance is measured 
using a principal-component factor analysis based on six governance 
variables: internal control weaknesses under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
404, an indicator representing no business ethics code, audit committee 
lacking of full independence, board lacking independence, percentage of 
shares held by insiders, and the inverse of audit fees. We find that none of 
level 1, level 2, and level 3 assets are associated with tax aggressiveness 
in well-governed firms, while level 3 assets reduce all the effective tax 
rate measures in poorly governed firms. The result indicates that 
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governance mechanisms discourage managers from rent seeking and tax 
sheltering, which can be complementary if tax sheltering increases 
opaqueness and motivates managers to extract more rents (Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006).  
Product market power depicts a firm’s ability to determine the price 
of its products in the marketplace, which enables the firm to transfer 
negative shocks to its customers through an increased price. Tax 
aggressiveness is perceived as a risky strategy. Product market power 
allows a firm to engage in more risk-taking activities as it provides a 
cushion against potential failures. We find that the three levels of fair 
value assets are not associated with tax aggressiveness for firms with less 
product market power, while level 2 and level 3 assets reduce the effective 
tax rates for firms with more market power. This result is consistent with 
the argument that product market power encourages firms to be more tax 
aggressive by using financial instrument tools. 
Firms with geographically dispersed operations can benefit from tax 
planning strategies, e.g., taking advantage of transfer pricing to shift 
income from high tax jurisdictions to low ones, and adopting cross-border 
hybrid instruments to avoid taxes (Gallemore and Labro 2015; 
Johannesen 2014). We find that for firms with lower geographic 
dispersion, level 1 and level 2 assets are associated with more tax 
aggressiveness, whereas for firms with greater geographic dispersion, 
level 2 and level 3 assets are associated with more tax aggressiveness. 
This result implies that the extent of a firm’s geographic dispersion can 
affect the type of instruments they choose in tax planning. Combining the 
three levels of assets together, the association between tax aggressiveness 
5 
 
and financial instruments is more pronounced for firms with greater 
geographic dispersion. 
Financial constraints would increase the cost of external funding to 
a firm. Cash savings from tax aggressiveness can be treated as an 
alternative funding source and be favorable to obtain when the firm faces 
increased financial constraints (Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2015; Law 
and Mills 2015). We find that in less financially constrained firms, level 1, 
level 2, and level 3 assets are not associated with tax aggressiveness 
generally. In more constrained firms, evidence shows that level 2 and 
level 3 assets are associated with lower effective tax rates. The result 
supports the argument that financial instruments, especially level 2 and 
level 3 assets, serve as an additional approach to generate more tax 
savings in financially constrained firms. 
We also adopt firms’ tax lobbying expenditures as an alternative 
proxy for tax aggressiveness and examine the association between 
financial assets from different levels of fair value hierarchy and firms’ tax 
lobbying expenditures. Tax lobbying data is obtained from the Center for 
Responsive Politics website.1 We find that level 2 and level 3 assets are 
positively associated with tax lobbying expenditures, while level 1 assets 
do not exhibit such a pattern, consistent with prior findings. The result 
also corroborates our evidence that tax aggressiveness associated with 
level 2 and level 3 instruments is greater than that associated with level 1 
instruments.  
                                                 
1 The Center for Responsive Politics website is available at 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/. Each year, companies, labor unions, and other 
organizations spend billilons of dollars to lobby Congress and federal agencies. The website 
maintains and provides firms’ spending on lobbying activities classified into approximately 
thirty issues. We focus on the tax issue. 
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Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, 
it advances the understanding of the association between tax 
aggressiveness and financial instruments from different levels of fair 
value hierarchy. Prior studies on fair value hierarchy document that level 
1 fair value estimates are most value relevant and have lowest 
measurement uncertainty, information risk and cost of capital, while level 
3 are least value relevant, with highest measurement uncertainty, 
information risk and cost of capital (Song, Thomas, and Yi 2010; Riedl and 
Serafeim 2011; Goh, Li, Ng, and Yong 2015), which take the perspective of 
investors. We show that tax aggressiveness associated with instruments 
differs across the three levels, an additional factor that managers would 
consider in making investment decisions. Second, we add to the literature 
that examines tax aggressiveness under an agency framework (Scholes, 
Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and Shevlin 1992; Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010). We find that level 3 instruments that involve most managerial 
discretion contribute to tax aggressiveness, but governance mechanisms 
mitigate this effect. Our finding is consistent with Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006) in that managerial rent extraction and tax aggressiveness are 
complementary to each other. Third, we provide an alternative reason 
why investors discount level 3 assets more. Tax aggressiveness is risky, 
the detection of which can result in penalties and reputation costs. This 
tax-related risk is incremental to the information risk embedded in level 3 
assets. Fourth, we contribute to the growing literature on financial 
products and tax aggressiveness. Prior research illustrates the tax 
benefits of many derivatives (McDonald 2004; Warren 2004; Donohoe 
2015a, 2015b). We expand the scope by looking into non-derivative 
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instruments and finding these instruments also associated with tax 
aggressiveness. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
background and related literature, and develops hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data, variable construction and descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Background, Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1. Financial instruments measured at fair value 
SFAS No. 159, The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and 
Financial liabilities, permits firms to opt to measure financial assets and 
liabilities and other items at fair value. One objective of this statement is 
to help firms reduce volatility of earnings contributed by differing 
measurement of related assets and liabilities. According to SFAS No. 159, 
this statement applies to the following items: recognized financial assets 
and financial liabilities, firm commitments that only incorporate ﬁnancial 
instruments, host financial instruments that arise from separating a 
nonfinancial derivative instrument and a nonfinancial hybrid instrument, 
and nonﬁnancial insurance contracts and warranties.2 Firms are allowed 
to exercise the fair value option to eligible items at election dates. This 
option can be applied instrument by instrument at managerial discretion. 
                                                 
2 Defined in SFAS No. 159, the recognized financial assets and financial liabilities exclude 
an investment in a subsidiary or an interest in a variable interest entity that the entity is 
required to consolidate; pension benefits, employee stock options and other forms of 
deferred compensation plans; capital leases under SFAS No. 13; deposit liabilities, savings 
and loan associations and other depository institutions; financial instruments classified as 
a component of shareholder’s equity. 
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While SFAS No. 159 expands the use of fair value measurement, 
SFAS No. 157 does not require any new fair value measurement. SFAS 
No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, establishes a formal framework to 
measure fair value and defines fair value as ―the price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly 
transaction between market participants at the measurement date‖. 
Furthermore, assets and liabilities subjected to fair value measurement 
are classified into a three-level hierarchy based on the observability of 
inputs (see Appendix B for an example). According to SFAS No. 157, level 
1 inputs are directly observable from quoted prices of identical assets or 
liabilities in active markets. Level 2 inputs are indirectly observable, 
which are based on quoted prices of similar instruments traded in active 
markets, identical instruments traded in inactive markets, or other 
market-related data. Level 3 inputs are most unobservable, which involve 
a large quantity of assumptions based on managers’ estimates. Hence, fair 
values of level 3 instruments are estimated using model-based techniques, 
e.g., discounted cash flow methods, option pricing methods, and other 
similar methods. In other words, level 1 fair value estimates are mark-to-
market estimates while level 3 (level 2) are mark-to-model estimates 
(adjusted mark-to-market estimates). 
SFAS No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and 
Equity Securities, classifies debt and equity securities into three 
categories. The statement defines held-to-maturity securities as debt 
securities that a firm has both intent and ability to hold to maturity, and 
these securities should be measured at amortized cost instead of fair value. 
Trading securities refer to those debt and equity securities that a firm 
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buys and holds in order to sell in the near term. Firms should report 
trading securities at fair value at measurement dates. The last category is 
available-for-sale securities, which include debt and equity securities that 
are not classified into the above two categories. Available-for-sale 
securities are also reported at fair value at measurement dates. 
SFAS No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities, governs recognition, measurement, and reporting of derivative 
instruments. This statement requires firms to recognize all derivative 
instruments as assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position 
and measure them at fair value. 
 
2.2. Taxation of financial instruments 
The use and the variety of financial instruments have increased 
dramatically over the past few decades. However, lacking a uniform 
theory impedes the development of taxation of such instruments in a 
complete and consistent manner. Within the confines of realization-based 
taxation system, gains and losses on financial assets are taxable only at 
the time of realization, e.g., sale or disposal of a firm’s investment in those 
assets. Several problems arise from the realization system. First, when 
taxation of gains and losses can be deferred, the effective tax rate on such 
gains and losses will be less than the statutory rate. Second, if a firm is 
able to defer gains while recognizing losses selectively, the value of 
deferral is increased. Third, a firm may strategically engage in 
transactions that produce no gain or loss in aggregate, but one or more 
components produce gains while others produce losses. Such a strategy is 
categorized as one form of tax planning activities. The second 
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phenomenon is also known as the timing option and the third one known 
as a tax straddle (Shuldiner 1992).3 
One approach to tackle the above problems would be the adoption of 
mark-to-market taxation for financial instruments. Under the mark-to-
market taxation system, the timing option no longer exists given that both 
gains and losses are recognized each period without considering a 
realization event or other actions of a firm. Along this line, Dave Camp, R-
Mich., Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, released a 
legislative proposal in 2013. The proposal is on reforming the tax 
treatment of financial products as part of the comprehensive tax reform. 
An important topic included in the proposal is the comprehensive changes 
that subject all derivative instruments to mark-to-market taxation and 
tax resulting gains and losses as ordinary income (see Appendix C for 
details). Under the current system, the tax treatment of derivative 
instruments involves the following principal issues: timing, character, and 
source of gains and losses. The complex and ambiguous nature of 
derivative instruments creates plenty of room for tax sheltering activities 
(Donohoe 2015a, 2015b). 
 
2.3. Incentives and disincentives of tax aggressiveness 
There is a long standing literature on corporate tax aggressiveness 
(Shackelford and Shevlin 2001; Maydew 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman 
2010). Tax savings arising from tax aggressiveness is a most obvious 
                                                 
3 Although the straddle rules can limit the timing option in the straddle case, the 
opportunity to make use of the timing option still exists if a firm is willing to assume risk. 
For example, a firm can invest in a portfolio of risky assets, whose returns are not 
perfectly correlated. The portfolio will not subject to straddle rules accordingly (Shuldiner 
1992).   
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benefit to a firm. If managers are compensated by the firm for their 
effective tax management, e.g., using more after-tax performance based 
incentives, they will continue to adopt a more aggressive tax strategy. 
Phillips (2003) documents that firms would have lower effective tax rates 
when the managers are compensated on after-tax income. Another type of 
benefit to managers is rent extraction arising from tax aggressiveness. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) examine the link between rent extraction 
and tax aggressiveness. They find that increases in incentive 
compensation lead to lower tax aggressiveness, which is driven by firms 
with weak corporate governance. They also suggest that tax aggressive 
activities comprise complex transactions that obscure the intent to avoid 
subsequent detections. Examples of tax aggressive strategies include 
holding tax-exempt municipal bonds, using complex hybrid instruments, 
shifting income to cross-border tax havens, and participating in other tax 
shelters (Engel, Erickson, and Maydew 1999; Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; 
Wilson 2009). 
Turning to the cost side, a direct cost comes from tax aggressive 
activities being detected and thus penalized by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). Another cost would be a price discount imposed by external 
shareholders because it is difficult for them to disentangle tax 
aggressiveness and rent extraction (Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Chen, 
Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010). Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) 
document that family firms engage in less tax aggressiveness compared 
with non-family firms due to family owners’ concerns about penalties and 
reputation damage from an IRS audit. These family firms voluntarily 
forgo tax savings to prevent the price discount from minority shareholders, 
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who perceive tax aggressive activities as a mask of family rent seeking. 
Desai, Dyck, and Zingales (2007) document that an increase in tax 
enforcement results in an increase in firms’ market value, which further 
supports the argument that investors react positively to regulatory 
changes that limit managers’ rent extraction related to tax activities. A 
reputational cost is also an important factor that constrains tax 
aggressiveness. Firms involved in tax sheltering activities suffer a 
significant decline in market value when their tax shelter participation is 
exposed by the media (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009).   
 
2.4. Fair value hierarchy and tax aggressiveness 
Prior studies indicate that Level 1 fair value estimates are most 
value relevant and subject to lowest measurement uncertainty (Song, 
Thomas, and Yi 2010; Goh, Li, Ng, and Yong 2015). They also have the 
lowest information risk and lowest cost of capital (Riedl and Serafeim 
2011). Level 1 instruments have a more transparent valuation method 
and a lower level of managerial discretion and information asymmetry 
compared with level 2 and level 3 instruments. Since level 1 instruments 
are more actively traded in the market, their fair values fluctuate greatly 
from period to period. Moreover, level 1 instruments largely comprise U.S. 
domestic equities, U.S. treasuries, international equities, mutual funds 
traded in stock exchanges, and agency securities, which are bought and 
held for selling in the near term. Gains and losses arising from these 
transactions are included in taxable income more rapidly, resulting in a 
more volatile income figure. Prior literature has documented that a 
reduction of taxable income volatility leads to lower taxes (Keyes 1997; 
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Graham and Smith 1999; Graham and Rogers 2002). Under a progressive 
tax system, facing an increasing marginal statutory tax rate, firms with 
smoother income are subject to lower taxes (Smith and Stulz 1985). 
Income smoothing also contributes to higher debt capacity, resulting in 
more tax deductible interest expenditures (Leland 1998). Therefore, level 
1 instruments are expected to be associated with lower tax aggressiveness. 
Level 2 and level 3 instruments are valued based on adjusted mark-
to-market or mark-to-model estimates. They often consist of corporate 
bonds, corporate notes, commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, 
municipal securities foreign government bonds, and most of derivatives. 
The complexity and the subjectivity of level 2 and level 3 fair value 
measurements subject them to greater managerial discretion and 
information asymmetry (Bens, Cheng, and Neamtiu 2015). Prior studies 
find that firms take advantage of multiple financial instruments, e.g., tax-
exempt municipal bonds, debt-equity hybrid securities, and cross-border 
hybrid instruments, to avoid taxes (Engel, Erickson, and Maydew 1999; 
Johannesen 2014). The complexity in nature and ambiguity in taxation of 
these financial instruments create plenty of room for managers to engage 
in tax aggressive activities without being exposed to high detection risks. 
Firms can even choose to coordinate the timing, character, and source of 
taxable income via the transactional form of derivatives, which are legally 
permissible (Donohoe 2015a, 2015b). In sum, level 2 and level 3 
instruments are associated with more tax aggressiveness. We propose our 
first hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: Tax aggressiveness associated with level 2 and level 
3 instruments is greater than that associated with 




On the other hand, the U.S. income tax standards adopt a balance 
sheet method to recognize and measure deferred income taxes. Differences 
between the book carrying values of assets and liabilities and their tax 
bases constitute taxable or deductible temporary differences. Given that 
fair value measurement affects the carrying amounts of instruments, it 
would affect temporary differences, deferred taxes and thereby effective 
tax rates.4 The more volatile the market pricing is, the greater the impact 
on effective tax rates will be. Based on this argument, level 1 instruments 
are associated with more tax aggressiveness. 
 
2.5. The effect of corporate governance 
Embedded in an agency framework, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
assert that tax aggressiveness and rent extraction are decisions made 
simultaneously by managers. They argue that tax aggressiveness and 
managerial rent extraction can be complementary if tax aggressive 
activities increase corporate opaqueness and in turn encourage managers 
to seek more rents from the firm. They find that increases in incentive 
compensation will reduce tax aggressiveness, and that this effect only 
exists in the subsample of firms with poor corporate governance. In other 
words, despite the benefits of tax aggressive activities, shareholders may 
                                                 
4 For example, SFAS No. 115 requires certain securities with readily available fair values 
to be mark-to-market (level 1 measurement) periodically, with gains (losses) credited 
(debited) to income for trading securities or to other comprehensive income for available-
for-sale securities. Periodic adjustments to the carrying amount of a security without 
corresponding adjustments to its tax basis will influence temporary differences and 
deferred taxes. Another example is that when an available-for-sale, marketable security 
has suffered other-than-temporary impairment, the impairment is recognized in income 
but may not be deductible on a tax return until a sale or disposal takes place. Therefore, a 
deductible temporary difference occurs and a deferred tax asset is to be assessed for 
realization. To the extent that the instrument requires a valuation allowance, there will be 
an effect on the effective tax rate.     
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not want managers to   engage in these activities as doing so creates 
opportunities for managers to extract rents from the firm. 
Financial instruments provide additional approaches for managers 
to avoid taxes, manage earnings, and obtain personal benefits (Choi, Mao, 
and Upadhyay 2013; Donohoe 2015a, 2015b). Good governance in place 
discourages managers from rent seeking and tax avoidance. Further, well-
governed firms have less scope for reductions of rent extraction and tax 
aggressive activities. Therefore, we expect a stronger association between 
tax aggressiveness and financial instruments for poorly governed firms. 
We propose the second hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: The association between tax aggressiveness and 




2.6. The effect of product market power 
Product market power constitutes a firm’s competitive advantage in 
the marketplace as it captures a firm’s ability to determine the price, 
quality, and nature of the product (Shepherd 1970). Kubick, Lynch, 
Mayberry, and Omer (2015) posit that product market power is perceived 
as a natural hedge that allows a firm to adopt more tax aggressive 
strategies. The mechanism is that firms with certain product market 
power are able to transfer negative shocks to downstream parties through 
aggressive price settings while firms with little product market power 
have no such ability as price takers. Tax aggressive strategies are risky 
and may have potential negative consequences. Product market power 
enables greater risk-taking and provides a cushion against tax 
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aggressiveness failures, a benefit not pertained to firms with little product 
market power. 
 For firms that possess more product market power, they have more 
incentives and capabilities to engage in tax aggressive activities, including 
taking advantage of financial instrument tools. For firms with less 
product market power, they undergo higher operating uncertainty and are 
less likely to involve in tax aggressiveness given the scarcity of resources 
and the resulting high opportunity costs (McGuire, Omer, and Wilde 
2014). We conjecture a stronger association between tax aggressiveness 
and financial instruments for firms with more product market power. We 
propose the third hypothesis as follows. 
Hypothesis 3: The association between tax aggressiveness and 
financial instruments is more pronounced for firms 
with more product market power. 
 
 
2.7. The effect of geographic dispersion 
Firms with highly dispersed operations confront a complex 
managerial decision-making environment. Although informational 
complexities and operational complexities may arise due to geographic 
dispersion, different legal systems, multiple currencies, etc., these firms 
can benefit from tax planning opportunities (Reeb, Kwok, and Baek 1998; 
Denis, Denis, and Yost 2002; Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith 2004). 
Often, the tax department operates at the corporate level despite a wide 
dispersion of operations (Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver 2010). Firms can 
adopt complex transfer pricing strategies to shift income to low tax 
jurisdictions to facilitate tax savings (Gallemore and Labro 2015).  
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Geographically dispersed operations provide firms with a broader 
scope to adopt cross-border hybrid instruments to avoid taxes. Johannesen 
(2014) proposes a model to demonstrate that using a hybrid instrument, 
which is treated as debt in the host country and equity in the home 
country, to finance foreign investments can generate significant tax 
savings. Thus we hypothesize a stronger association between tax 
aggressiveness and financial instruments for firms with greater 
geographic dispersion. The fourth hypothesis is stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 4: The association between tax aggressiveness and 
financial instruments is more pronounced for firms 
with greater geographic dispersion. 
 
 
2.8. The effect of financial constraint 
When a firm faces increased financial constraints, external financing 
to fund investments become more costly or less accessible to the firm. 
Recently, cash savings from tax aggressiveness is perceived as an 
alternative financing source (Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2015; Law 
and Mills 2015). Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin (2015) document that an 
increase in financial constraints encourages firms to undertake more 
aggressive cash tax planning. Using the count of negative words in a 
firm’s annual reports as a new measure of financial constraints, Law and 
Mills (2015) find that financially constrained firms are associated with 
more tax aggressiveness. 
More constrained firms favor tax aggressive strategies to generate 
additional internal funds as cash savings via deferral-based tax planning 
is legitimate and is less likely to influence a firm’s normal operations 
adversely. Financial instruments serve as an additional approach to 
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pursue tax aggressive strategies. Therefore, we anticipate a stronger 
association between tax aggressiveness and financial instruments for 
financially constrained firms. The fifth hypothesis is proposed as follows.   
Hypothesis 5: The association between tax aggressiveness and 
financial instruments is more pronounced for 
financially constrained firms. 
 
 
3. Data, Variable Construction, and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Data and sample selection 
We retrieve financial statement information from Compustat and 
select years 2008-2014 as our sample period. Our sample starts from the 
year 2008 because SFAS 157 and SFAS 159 are effective for years 
beginning after November 15, 2007. We exclude financial firms, utility 
firms, firms with foreign headquarters and firms with missing financial 
data. We also require firms to have price information from Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We obtain firms’ tax lobbying data 
from the Center for Responsive Politics website. Following prior studies, 
we focus on firms’ spending on tax-related lobbying activities (Hill, Kubick, 
Lockhart, and Wan 2013; Davis, Guenther, Krull, and Williams 2015). We 
make use of a string matching algorithm accompanied by manual 
checking to merge this data with the sample based on firm names.5 
Finally, our sample comprises 13,728 firm-year observations. 
 
                                                 
5 For firms without data on the lobbying database, we assume the tax lobbying 




3.2. Variable construction 
3.2.1. Measures of tax aggressiveness 
The first tax aggressiveness measure is the overall effective tax rate 
(ETR), which is computed as total tax expense divided by pre-tax book 
income. To eliminate the potential effect of special items, the second 
effective tax rate (GAAP) is computed as total tax expense divided by pre-
tax book income less special item. Total tax expense is composed of 
current tax expense and deferred tax expense, and the latter contributes 
to temporary book-tax difference. To capture this deferral-based tax 
aggressiveness, we adopt the current effective tax rate (CURR), which is 
computed as current tax expense divided by pre-tax book income less 
special items. The fourth measure we use is the cash effective tax rate 
(CASH), which is computed as cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax book 
income less special items. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) argue that 
the cash effective tax rate is more preferable to use because it considers 
the tax benefits of employee stock options and is not affected by accrual-
based estimates (e.g., the tax contingency reserve, and the valuation 
allowance). Lower effective tax rates indicate greater tax aggressiveness. 
In further analysis, we also use tax lobbying expenditure (LOBBY) to 
proxy for tax aggressiveness. The measure is computed as a firm’s 
reported lobbying expenditure for tax purposes divided by lagged total 





3.2.2. Measures of corporate governance, product market power, geographic 
dispersion, and financial constraints 
To measure corporate governance (CG), we follow Song, Thomas, 
and Yi (2010) and take advantage of a principal-component factor analysis 
of six corporate governance variables: internal control weaknesses under 
SOX 404, an indicator representing no business ethics code, audit 
committee lacking of full independence, board lacking independence, 
percentage of shares held by insiders, and the inverse of audit fees.6 This 
approach reduces the measurement error of individual governance 
variables and constructs a more comprehensive proxy for governance 
quality. A higher value of CG indicates worse corporate governance. 
Introduced by Lerner (1934) and modified by Kubick, Lynch, 
Mayberry, and Omer (2015), the price-cost margin (PCM) is used to 
examine a firm’s product market power relative to its industry peers. 
PCM is computed as a firm’s operating profit, defined as sales less cost of 
goods sold less selling, general, and administrative expense, divided by its 
sales and then minus the industry average price-cost margin. The 
adjusted PCM is a firm-level deviation from the industry mean and thus 
controls for structural industry differences (Peress 2010). A higher value 
of PCM represents more product market power. 
Following prior studies (Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith 2004; 
Gallemore and Labro 2015), we measure geographic dispersion (GD) as 
the sum of squares of the ratio of firm sales in each geographic segment to 
total sales, subtracting one, and multiplying by negative one. GD ranges 
between zero and one, with zero indicating firms with only one segment. A 
higher value of GD means greater geographic dispersion. 
                                                 
6 We also employ different sets of governance variables and find results do not change 
significantly to the variation of governance variable selections. 
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 We adopt the size-age or SA index proposed by Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010) to measure firms’ financial constraints. The SA index (SA) is 
computed as (−0.737*Size) + (0.043*Size2) − (0.040*Age). Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) argue that the SA index is appealing to use because it is 
intuitive, not based on various theoretical assumptions, and supported by 
corroborating evidence from alternative approaches.7 A higher value of SA 
indicates increased financial constraints. 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
Following prior literature (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008; 
Frank, Lynch, and Rego 2009; Wilson 2009; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and 
Shevlin 2010; Rego and Wilson 2012; Chyz, Leung, Li, and Rui 2013), we 
control for other determinants of tax aggressiveness such as profitability 
(ROA), leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), whether there is a loss carry forward 
(NOL and NOL_CHANGE), foreign income (FI), firm size (SIZE), and 
growth opportunities (MB). We also control for differences in book and tax 
treatments of fixed assets (PPE), intangible assets (INTANG), and equity 
in earnings (EQINC). 
ROA is a firm’s return on assets measured as operating income 
divided by lagged total assets. ROA is expected to be positively associated 
with effective tax rates since more profitable firms bear higher marginal 
tax rates (Gupta and Newberry 1997). 
LEVERAGE is computed as long-term debt divided by lagged total 
assets. Graham (1996) documents a negative association between leverage 
                                                 
7 As a robustness test, we adopt the KZ index which is widely used to proxy for financial 
cosntraints (Kaplan and Zingales 1997; Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo 2001). Results 
remain qualitatively similar to those when the SA index is used. 
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and marginal tax rates as debt provides an important tax shield. 
Moreover, firms can adopt debt instruments to reduce their tax burdens 
by using foreign tax credits or placing debt in high-tax jurisdictions 
(Newberry 1998; Newberry and Dhaliwal 2001). Therefore, we expect 
LEVERAGE to be negatively associated with effective tax rates. 
NOL represents a firm’s net operating loss position and is an 
indicator equal to 1 if loss carry forward is positive and 0 otherwise. 
NOL_CHANGE measures the change in the loss carry forward divided by 
lagged total assets. NOL firms are less profitable and can use the loss 
carry forward to reduce their taxable income (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and 
Shevlin 2010; Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2015). Thus we expect these 
firms to have lower effective tax rates. 
FI is computed as pre-tax foreign income divided by lagged total 
assets. Multinational firms can locate their income in low tax jurisdictions 
and adopt other tax sheltering strategies more easily. However, Dyreng, 
Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock (2015) assert that the potentials to 
reduce effective tax rates are as significant for domestic income as for 
foreign income. Thus we do not make a prediction on the association 
between FI and effective tax rates. 
SIZE is measured as natural logarithm of market value of equity. 
On the one hand, firm size can be positively associated with effective tax 
rates since large firms attract more public and political attention. On the 
other hand, large firms can pursue favorable tax treatments through 
lobbying activities and enjoy lower effective tax rates (Siegfried 1972; 
Porcano 1986). Given above, we do not predict the association between 
firm size and effective tax rates.  
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MB is a firm’s market-to-book ratio computed as market value of 
equity divided by book value of equity. MB captures a firm’s future 
economic growth. Given that growth firms and mature firms confront 
different tax sheltering opportunities arising from differing tax planning 
incentives, we refrain from predicting the sign of MB. 
PPE represents a firm’s capital intensity and is measured as net 
property, plant, and equipment divided by lagged total assets. Gupta and 
Newberry (1997) find that capital-intensive firms are associated with 
lower effective tax rates, which is consistent with government tax 
subsidies to encourage more investments in capital assets. We expect that 
PPE is negatively associated with effective tax rates. 
INTANG depicts a firm’s asset intangibility and is measured as 
intangible assets divided by lagged total assets. EQINC captures a firm’s 
earnings from equity-method investments. It is calculated as equity 
income in earnings divided by lagged total assets. We follow Chen, Chen, 
Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) to control for these two variables because 
intangibles and earnings under the equity method would give rise to 
differential book and tax treatments. Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 
(2010) find that INTANG is positively associated with effective tax rates, 
and EQINC is negatively associated with effective tax rates. We expect to 
find similar results in our sample.  
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample with 
13,728 firm-year observations. The four effective tax rates have mean 
values ranging from 17.6% to 23%, all of which fall below the statutory tax 
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rate of 35%. Instruments classified under fair value assets (FVAPER) 
constitute an average of 13.7% of total assets while instruments classified 
under fair value liabilities (FVLPER) constitute 2.9% of total assets. 
Among fair value assets, the average of level 1 (AL1), level 2 (AL2), and 
level 3 (AL3) instruments is 8.2%, 4.8%, and 0.6% of total assets, 
respectively. The standard deviation of AL1, AL2, and AL3 is 0.153, 0.122, 
and 0.03, respectively. Thus AL1 instruments have a greater proportion 
and a higher volatility compared with AL2 and AL3 instruments. For 
instruments under fair value liabilities, the proportion of each level (LL1, 
LL2, and LL3) is generally smaller and the volatility does not differ 
significantly among different levels of fair value liabilities. 
Table 2 presents Pearson correlation matrix for the full sample. 
FVAPER and FVLPER are negatively associated with all of the effective 
tax rates, which suggests that firms employing more financial 
instruments are associated with more tax aggressiveness. AL1, AL2, and 
AL3 are also negatively associated with the four effective tax rates. 
Moreover, the magnitudes of correlation coefficients decrease from AL1 to 
AL3 in a consistent manner, lending initial support to Hypothesis 1. The 
associations between LL1, LL2, and LL3 and the four effective tax rates 
are much weaker. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Financial instruments and tax aggressiveness 
To examine the association between financial instruments measured 
at fair value and tax aggressiveness, we partition instruments into those 
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classified under fair value assets and those under fair value liabilities as a 
first step. The regression model is specified as follows. 
TAX_AGGi,t = β0 + β1FVAPERi,t + β2FVLPERi,t + β3ROAi,t  
                                    + β4LEVERAGEi,t + β5NOLi,t + β6NOL_CHANGEi,t  
                                    + β7FIi,t + β8PPEi,t + β9INTANGi,t + β10EQINCi,t  
                                    + β11SIZEi,t-1 + β12MBi,t-1 + Year Indicators  
                                    + Industry Indicators + εi,t,    (1) 
 
where i and t represent firm i and year t, respectively. TAX_AGG is tax 
aggressiveness measures ETR, GAAP, CURR, and CASH. FVAPER is the 
amount of fair value assets as a percentage of total assets. FVLPER is the 
amount of fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. Control 
variables are as defined earlier. We control for industry and year fixed 
effects by including industry and year indicators in the model. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
mitigate the effects of outliers. T-statistics are based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level 
(Petersen 2009). Appendix A details definitions for all the variables in our 
regression model. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of Equation (1). The 
coefficient on FVAPER is negative and significant across all tax 
aggressiveness measures (-0.064, t = -2.6 for ETR; -0.054, t = -1.69 for 
GAAP; -0.087, t = -4.0 for CURR; -0.07, t = -3.48 for CASH, respectively), 
which indicates that firms with greater proportions of fair value assets are 
more tax aggressive. To gauge the economic significance, when moving 
FVAPER from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, (1) ETR reduces 
by 1.2% (a 5.2% decrease over the sample mean); (2) GAAP reduces by 1% 
(a 4.4% decrease over the sample mean); (3) CURR reduces by 1.6% (a 8.2% 
decrease over the sample mean); and (4) CASH reduces by 1.3% (a 7.4% 
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decrease over the sample mean). This indicates that fair value assets can 
exert an economically significant effect on firms’ effective tax rates. The 
coefficient on FVLPER is consistently insignificant across all the four 
columns, suggesting that fair value liabilities do not help reduce firms’ 
effective tax rates. Results also show that firms with larger size, greater 
profitability, lower leverage, less loss carry forward, lower capital 
intensity, more intangible assets, more foreign income, and lower 
earnings under equity method are associated with higher effective tax 
rates, consistent with our prior predictions.  
    The second step is to further partition fair value assets into three 
levels (AL1, AL2, and AL3) based on the fair value hierarchy. Since 
FVLPER does not load in the first step, we do not partition fair value 
liabilities accordingly.8 The regression model changes slightly to the 
following: 
TAX_AGGi,t = β0 + β1AL1i,t + β2AL2i,t + β3AL3i,t + β4FVLPERi,t  
                                     + β5ROAi,t + β6LEVERAGEi,t + β7NOLi,t  
                                     + β8NOL_CHANGEi,t + β9FIi,t + β10PPEi,t  
                                     + β11INTANGi,t + β12EQINCi,t + β13SIZEi,t-1 + β14MBi,t-1  
                                     + Year Indicators + Industry Indicators + εi,t,    (2) 
 
where TAX_AGG is tax aggressiveness measures ETR, GAAP, CURR, and 
CASH. AL1, AL2, and AL3 are level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets 
as a percentage of total assets, respectively. We include industry and year 
indicators in the model to control for industry and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm 
level (Petersen 2009). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles. Appendix A details definitions for all the variables in 
the regression model. 
                                                 
8 As a robustness test, we partition FVLPER and involve LL1, LL2, and LL3 into the 




Table 4 presents the estimation results of Equation (2). Based on 
Hypothesis 1, the coefficient on level 1 fair value assets is expected to be 
lower than those on level 2 and level 3 fair value assets in magnitude. We 
find that the coefficients on level 2 and level 3 fair value assets are 
negative and significant for all tax aggressiveness measures (AL2:  -0.099, 
t = -2.98 for ETR; -0.111, t = -2.68 for GAAP; -0.124, t = -3.76 for CURR; -
0.147, t = -5.24 for CASH, respectively. AL3: -0.468, t = -2.85 for ETR; -
0.321, t = -1.66 for GAAP; -0.441, t = -2.79 for CURR; -0.361, t = -2.39 for 
CASH, respectively) while the coefficient on level 1 asset is only 
significant for one of them (-0.026, t = -0.92 for ETR; -0.010, t = -0.28 for 
GAAP; -0.048, t = -2.03 for CURR; -0.010, t = -0.40 for CASH, respectively). 
Further, the coefficient on fair value liabilities is still insignificant across 
the four columns. Similar to results from Table 3, the control variables in 
Table 4 have their predicted signs.  
To compare the magnitude of effect, we provide tests of whether the 
coefficients on level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets (β1, β2, and β3) 
are equal to each other at the bottom part of Table 4. Results show that β1 
is significantly different from both β2 and β3 for all tax aggressiveness 
measures (p < 0.05 in most cases). Therefore, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on level 1 fair value assets is much lower than those on level 2 
and level 3 fair value assets, supporting Hypothesis 1 that tax 
aggressiveness associated with level 2 and level 3 instruments is greater 




4.2. Corporate governance, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness 
To investigate whether and how the association between assets from 
different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax aggressiveness varies with 
corporate governance (CG), we perform partitioned sample analysis. 
Firms are classified into poor corporate governance subsample if they are 
in the upper quartile of CG or into good corporate governance subsample 
if they are in the lower quartile of CG of each year. We re-estimate 
Equation (2) for poor CG subsample and good CG subsample separately.9 
Table 5 presents the cross-sectional estimation results for corporate 
governance. In the good CG subsample, coefficients on level 1, level 2, and 
level 3 fair value assets do not load for any tax aggressiveness measure, 
which suggests that well-governed firms do not use instruments to lower 
their effective tax rates. In the poor CG subsample, the coefficient on level 
3 fair value assets is negative and significant for all tax aggressiveness 
measures (-0.741, t = -1.84 for ETR; -0.715, t = -1.64 for GAAP; -0.436, t = -
2.31 for CURR; -0.422, t = -2.36 for CASH, respectively). The coefficient on 
AL2 is significantly negative only in two cases (-0.082, t = -1.27 for ETR; -
0.095, t = -1.36 for GAAP; -0.078, t = -1.84 for CURR; -0.099, t = -2.56 for 
CASH, respectively). The coefficient on AL1 is not significant for any tax 
aggressiveness measure (-0.016, t = -0.30 for ETR; 0.006, t = 0.09 for 
GAAP; -0.062, t = -1.28 for CURR; -0.060, t = -1.23 for CASH, respectively).  
The bottom of Table 5 shows that in the good CG subsample, 
coefficients on level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets do not differ 
significantly from each other, whereas the magnitude of the coefficient on 
                                                 
9 As a robustness check, we also include CG as an additional control variable in the 
partitioned sample analysis and obtain qualitatively similar results. We apply this method 




level 1 fair value assets is significantly lower than that on level 3 fair 
value assets in the poor CG subsample. When AL1, AL2, and AL3 are 
combined to be total fair value assets, the magnitude of the coefficient on 
total fair value assets is also lower in the good CG subsample than that in 
the poor CG subsample. In sum, results show that the association between 
assets from different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax aggressiveness 
is more pronounced for poorly governed firms, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. 
 
4.3. Product market power, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness 
To examine whether firms with differential product market power 
(PCM) exhibit distinct tax aggressive patterns related to instruments 
measured at fair value, we classify firms into high or low PCM subsample 
based on the median value of price-cost margin of each year. We re-
estimate Equation (2) for high PCM subsample and low PCM subsample 
separately. 
Table 6 presents the cross-sectional estimation results for product 
market power. Coefficients on level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets 
are generally insignificant in the low PCM subsample. In the high PCM 
subsample, coefficients on level 2, and level 3 fair value assets are 
negative and significant for all tax aggressiveness measures (AL2:  -0.143, 
t = -2.64 for ETR; -0.180, t = -2.59 for GAAP; -0.176, t = -3.05 for CURR; -
0.152, t = -3.63 for CASH, respectively. AL3: -0.830, t = -2.59 for ETR; -
0.442, t = -1.19 for GAAP; -0.793, t = -2.43 for CURR; -0.799, t = -2.82 for 
CASH, respectively) while the coefficient on level 1 fair value assets stays 
insignificant for three out of four measures (-0.084, t =  -1.85 for ETR; -
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0.026, t = -0.41 for GAAP; -0.057, t = -1.45 for CURR; 0.006, t = 0.17 for 
CASH, respectively).  
The bottom of Table 6 displays that for firms with lower product 
market power, coefficients on level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets 
do not differ from each other, while the magnitude of the coefficient on 
level 1 fair value assets is significantly lower than those on level 2 and 
level 3 fair value assets for firms with higher product market power. 
When we group three levels of fair value assets into one, the magnitude of 
this coefficient is also lower in the low PCM subsample than that in the 
high PCM subsample, thereby supporting Hypothesis 3 that the 
association between tax aggressiveness and assets from different levels of 
fair value hierarchy is more pronounced for firms with more product 
market power. 
 
4.4. Geographic dispersion, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness 
According to Hypothesis 4, greater geographic dispersion enables 
firms to use financial instruments to avoid taxes. To test the mediating 
effect of geographic dispersion (GD), we partition the sample into high GD 
and low GD subsamples based on the median value of geographic 
dispersion of each year. We re-estimate Equation (2) for high GD 
subsample and low GD subsample separately. 
Table 7 presents the cross-sectional estimation results for 
geographic dispersion. An interesting finding is that while the coefficient 
on level 2 fair value assets loads in both subsamples for all tax 
aggressiveness measures, the coefficient on level 1 fair value assets loads 
in the low GD subsample (-0.101, t = -2.11 for ETR; -0.102, t = -1.71 for 
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GAAP; -0.087, t = -2.53 for CURR; -0.029, t = -0.77 for CASH, respectively) 
and the coefficient on level 3 fair value assets loads in the high GD 
subsample (-0.727, t = -2.69 for ETR; -0.618, t = -1.92 for GAAP; -0.689, t = 
-2.65 for CURR; -0.681, t = -2.91 for CASH, respectively). This result 
indicates that the extent of firms’ geographic dispersion can affect the 
type of instruments they choose in tax planning strategies.  
The bottom of Table 7 displays that coefficients on level 1, level 2, 
and level 3 fair value assets do not differ from each other in the low GD 
subsample, while the magnitude of the coefficient on level 1 fair value 
assets is significantly lower than those on level 2 and level 3 fair value 
assets in the high GD subsample. Moreover, when combining all three 
levels of fair value assets into a new variable, its coefficient has a lower 
magnitude for geographically less dispersed firms than that for 
geographically more dispersed firms. Taken together, results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 4 that the association between tax 
aggressiveness and assets from different levels of fair value hierarchy is 
more pronounced for firms with greater geographic dispersion. 
 
4.5. Financial constraint, fair value hierarchy, and tax aggressiveness 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that more financially constrained firms are 
motivated to use financial instruments aggressively to save tax payments. 
To capture the mediating effect of financial constraints (SA), we partition 
the sample into high SA and low SA subsamples according to the median 
value of the size-age index of each year. We re-estimate Equation (2) for 
high SA subsample and low SA subsample separately. 
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Table 8 presents the cross-sectional estimation results for firms’ 
financial constraints. We find that coefficients on level 1, level 2, and level 
3 fair value assets generally do not load for different tax aggressiveness 
measures in the low SA subsample. Coefficients on level 2 and level 3 fair 
value assets are negative and significant for all tax aggressiveness 
measures (AL2:  -0.122, t = -3.00 for ETR; -0.144, t = -2.61 for GAAP; -
0.122, t = -2.93 for CURR; -0.134, t = -3.76 for CASH, respectively. AL3: -
0.982, t = -2.51 for ETR; -0.921, t = -1.89 for GAAP; -1.095, t = -2.82 for 
CURR; -1.202, t = -2.72 for CASH, respectively) while the coefficient on 
level 1 fair value assets is only significant for one measure in the high SA 
subsample (-0.026, t = -0.85 for ETR; -0.003, t = -0.07 for GAAP; -0.043, t = 
-1.70 for CURR; 0.003, t = 0.13 for CASH, respectively).  
The bottom of Table 8 shows that in less financially constrained 
firms, coefficients on level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets do not 
differ from each other in general, whereas in more constrained firms, the 
magnitude of the coefficient on level 1 fair value assets is significantly 
lower than those on level 2 and level 3 fair value assets. Further, when we 
combine AL1, AL2, and AL3 to yield total fair value assets, the magnitude 
of the coefficient on total fair value assets is lower for less financially 
constrained firms than that for more financially constrained firms. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence supports Hypothesis 5 that the 
association between tax aggressiveness and assets from different levels of 




4.6. Fair value hierarchy and tax lobbying 
Besides using effective tax rates, we further take advantage of tax 
lobbying data to identify a specific form of firms’ tax aggressive strategies. 
More expenditure on tax lobbying activities represents a more aggressive 
tax policy by a firm. We estimate Equation (2) with tax lobbying 
expenditure as an alternative proxy for tax aggressiveness. Table 9 
presents the estimation results of the association between assets from 
different levels of fair value hierarchy and the amount spent on tax 
lobbying activities. The dependent variable is tax lobbying expenditure 
(LOBBY). In Column (1), only level 1, level 2, and level 3 fair value assets, 
fair value liabilities, industry indicators and year indicators are included 
in the model. We find that coefficients on level 2 and level 3 fair value 
assets are positive and significant while the coefficient on level 1 fair 
value assets is not (0.021, t = 1.1 for AL1; 0.095, t = 3.85 for AL2; 0.408, t = 
2.55 for AL3, respectively). The bottom of Table 9 displays that the 
magnitude of the coefficient on level 1 fair value assets is significantly 
lower than those on level 2 and level 3 fair value assets (p < 0.05). This 
result suggests that firms using more level 2 and level 3 instruments 
spend more on tax lobbying activities. The coefficient on fair value 
liabilities is also positive and significant, but only to a marginal level 
(0.055, t = 1.68). When we further include control variables in Column (2), 
results remain qualitatively similar. Coefficients on level 2 and level 3 fair 
value assets continue to load while the coefficient on level 1 fair value 
assets does not (-0.015, t = -0.70 for AL1; 0.055, t = 2.15 for AL2; 0.354, t = 
2.20 for AL3, respectively). The magnitudes of coefficients also increase 
from level 1 to level 3 fair value assets, lending further support to 
Hypothesis 1 that tax aggressiveness associated with level 2 and level 3 
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instruments is greater than that associated with level 1 instruments. 
Therefore, results on tax lobbying expenditure corroborate prior findings.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the association between financial instruments 
from different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax aggressiveness. Level 
1 instruments trade actively in the market, whose short-term nature 
induces more volatile earnings and more income taxes. The complexity in 
nature and ambiguity in taxation of level 2 and level 3 instruments 
subject them to more managerial discretion, creating large space for 
managers to engage in tax aggressive activities. Thus we expect level 2 
and level 3 instruments to be associated with more tax aggressiveness 
than level 1 instruments. 
Empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that tax 
aggressiveness associated with level 2 and level 3 instruments is greater 
than that associated with level 1 instruments. The cross-sectional tests 
provide evidence that the association between tax aggressiveness and 
financial instruments is more pronounced for poorly governed firms, firms 
with more product market power, firms that are more geographically 
dispersed, or more financially constrained firms. We complement effective 
tax rate measures with firms’ tax lobbying expenditures and find 
consistent results that level 2 and level 3 instruments are associated with 
more tax lobbying expenditures while level 1 instruments are not. 
Our evidence has implications for the tax reform proposal on 
expanding the use of mark-to-market taxation of financial products. We 
show that level 1 instruments are associated with the lowest level of tax 
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aggressiveness. The mark-to-market rule not only simplifies the current 
taxation system, but also reduces the scope for managerial discretion and 
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ETR Effective tax rate measured as total tax expense divided by pre-tax 
book income. 
GAAP Effective tax rate measured as total tax expense divided by pre-tax 
book income less special items. 
CURR Current effective tax rate measured as current tax expense divided 
by pre-tax book income less special items. Current tax expense is 
calculated by subtracting deferred income taxes from total tax 
expense. 
CASH Cash effective tax rate measured as cash taxes paid divided by pre-
tax book income less special items.  
FVAPER The amount of fair value assets as a percentage of total assets. 
AL1 The amount of Level 1 fair value assets as a percentage of total 
assets. 
AL2 The amount of Level 2 fair value assets as a percentage of total 
assets. 
AL3 The amount of Level 3 fair value assets as a percentage of total 
assets. 
FVLPER The amount of fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. 
LL1 The amount of Level 1 fair value liabilities as a percentage of total 
assets. 
LL2 The amount of Level 2 fair value liabilities as a percentage of total 
assets. 
LL3 The amount of Level 3 fair value liabilities as a percentage of total 
assets. 
ROA Return on assets measured as operating income divided by lagged 
total assets. 
LEVERAGE Leverage ratio measured as long-term debt divided by lagged total 
assets. 
NOL Indicator variable equal to 1 if loss carry forward is positive and 0 
otherwise. 
NOL_CHANGE Change in the loss carry forward divided by lagged total assets. 
FI Pre-tax foreign income divided by lagged total assets. 
PPE Capital intensity measured as net property, plant, and equipment 
divided by lagged total assets. 
INTANG Intangible assets divided by lagged total assets. 
EQINC Equity income in earnings divided by lagged total assets. 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market value of equity. 
MB Market-to-book ratio measured as market value of equity divided by 
book value of equity. 
CG Corporate governance measured as the principal-component factor of 
six governance variables: internal control weakness under SOX 404, 
an indicator representing no business ethics code, audit committee 
lacking of full independence, board lacking independence, percentage 
of shares held by insiders, and inverse of audit fees. 
PCM Price-cost margin measured as operating profit divided by sales of 
each firm minus the value-weighted industry average (based on two-
digit SIC). Operating profit is calculated as sales less cost of goods 
sold less selling, general, and administrative expense. 
GD Geographic dispersion measured as the sum of squares of the ratio of 
firm sales in each geographic segment to total sales, subtracting one, 
and multiplying by negative one. 
SA SA index measured as (−0.737*Size) + (0.043*Size2) − (0.040*Age). 
Age is the number of years that a ﬁrm has been listed.  
LOBBY Lobbying expenditure measured as a firm's reported lobbying 







Excerpt from Microsoft Corporation Form 10-K for the 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2009 – Fair Value Measurement 
 
SFAS No. 157 defines fair value as the price that would be received upon sale of 
an asset or paid upon transfer of a liability in an orderly transaction between 
market participants at the measurement date and in the principal or most 
advantageous market for that asset or liability. The fair value should be 
calculated based on assumptions that market participants would use in pricing 
the asset or liability, not on assumptions specific to the entity. In addition, the 
fair value of liabilities should include consideration of non-performance risk, 
including our own credit risk. 
In addition to defining fair value, SFAS No. 157 expands the disclosure 
requirements around fair value and establishes a fair value hierarchy for 
valuation inputs. The hierarchy prioritizes the inputs into three levels based on 
the extent to which inputs used in measuring fair value are observable in the 
market. Each fair value measurement is reported in one of the three levels, which 
is determined by the lowest level input that is significant to the fair value 
measurement in its entirety. These levels are:  
• Level 1 – inputs are based upon unadjusted quoted prices for identical 
instruments traded in active markets.  
• Level 2 – inputs are based upon quoted prices for similar instruments in 
active markets, quoted prices for identical or similar instruments in 
markets that are not active, and model-based valuation techniques for 
which all significant assumptions are observable in the market or can be 
corroborated by observable market data for substantially the full term of 
the assets or liabilities.  
• Level 3 – inputs are generally unobservable and typically reflect 
management’s estimates of assumptions that market participants would 
use in pricing the asset or liability. The fair values are therefore 
determined using model-based techniques that include option pricing 
models, discounted cash flow models, and similar techniques.  
The following section describes the valuation methodologies we use to measure 
financial assets and liabilities at fair value. 
Investments Other Than Derivatives 
Investments other than derivatives primarily include U.S. Government and 
Agency securities, foreign government bonds, mortgage-backed securities, 
commercial paper, corporate notes and bonds, and common and preferred stock.  
In general, and where applicable, we use quoted prices in active markets for 
identical assets or liabilities to determine fair value. This pricing methodology 
applies to our Level 1 investments, such as domestic and international equities, 
U.S. treasuries, exchange-traded mutual funds, and agency securities. If quoted 
prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities are not available to 
determine fair value, then we use quoted prices for similar assets and liabilities 
or inputs other than the quoted prices that are observable either directly or 
indirectly. These investments are included in Level 2 and consist primarily of 
corporate notes and bonds, foreign government bonds, mortgage-backed 
securities, commercial paper, and certain agency securities. Our Level 3 assets 
primarily include investments in certain corporate bonds. We value the Level 3 
corporate bonds using internally developed valuation models, inputs to which 
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include interest rate curves, credit spreads, stock prices, and volatilities. 
Unobservable inputs used in these models are significant to the fair values of the 
investments. 
Derivatives  
In general, and where applicable, we use quoted prices in an active market for 
identical derivative assets and liabilities that are traded on exchanges. These 
derivative assets and liabilities are included in Level 1. The fair values for the 
derivative assets and liabilities included in Level 2 are estimated using industry 
standard valuation models, such as the Black-Scholes model. Where applicable, 
these models project future cash flows and discount the future amounts to a 
present value using market-based observable inputs including interest rate 
curves, foreign exchange rates, and forward and spot prices for currencies and 
commodities. Level 2 derivative assets and liabilities primarily include certain 
over-the-counter options, futures, and swap contracts. In certain cases, market-
based observable inputs are not available and we use management judgment to 
develop assumptions to determine fair value. These derivative assets and 
liabilities are included in Level 3 and primarily represent derivatives for foreign 
equities. 
Assets and Liabilities Measured at Fair Value on a Recurring Basis  
The following table presents our assets and liabilities at June 30, 2009, which are 
measured at fair value on a recurring basis:  
 (In millions)    Level 1    Level 2    Level 3    
Gross Fair 
Value    
FIN No. 39 
Netting(a)     
Net Fair 
Value 
       
Assets                                          
Mutual funds    $ 982    $ –    $ –    $ 982    $ –      $ 982 
Commercial paper      –      2,601      –      2,601      –        2,601 
Certificates of deposit      –      555      –      555      –        555 
U.S. Government and Agency 
securities      7,134      6,105      –      13,239      –        13,239 
Foreign government bonds      501      3,022      –      3,523      –        3,523 
Mortgage-backed securities      –      3,593      –      3,593      –        3,593 
Corporate notes and bonds      –      4,073      253      4,326      –        4,326 
Municipal securities      –      256      –      256      –        256 
Common and preferred stock      4,218      28      5      4,251      –        4,251 
Derivatives      5      623      5      633      (235 )      398 
  





















Total    $ 12,840    $ 20,856    $ 263    $ 33,959    $ (235 )    $ 33,724 
     
        
   
        
   
        
   
        
   




        
Liabilities                                          
Derivatives    $ 5    $ 344    $ –    $ 349    $ (231 )    $ 118 
  


























(a) FIN No. 39, Offsetting of Amounts Related to Certain Contracts – an 
interpretation of APB No. 10 and FASB Statement No. 105, permits the 
netting of derivative assets and derivative liabilities when a legally 
enforceable master netting agreement exists. These amounts include fair 






House Ways and Means Committee’s Tax Reform Proposals for 
Financial Products – The Mark-to-Market Proposal10 
 
Background 
Several current law provisions inform the tax treatment of derivative financial 
instruments. In some cases, the type of product governs taxation. In others, the 
class of taxpayer holding the security governs its tax treatment. The principal 
issues are the timing of recognition of income and, because of the distinction 
made in the tax law between capital gains and losses and ordinary gains and 




1. The Camp proposal. At the heart of the Camp proposal is the addition of new 
section 485, which would subject all derivatives to mark-to-market treatment, 
with the gain or loss being ordinary income. Existing section 475 would be 
rewritten, with all the derivative provisions being culled out. New section 486, 
defining the term "derivative," would also be added. Thus, section 485 would 
apply to (1) "any evidence of an interest in" (or any derivative financial 
instrument with respect to) any share of stock in a corporation; any partnership 
or beneficial ownership interest in a partnership or trust; any note, bond, 
debenture, or other evidence of indebtedness; any real property (with some 
exceptions); any commodity actively traded (within the meaning of section 
1092(d)(1)); or any currency; (2) any NPC; and (3) "any derivative financial 
instrument with respect to" any interest or instrument described in subsections 1 
and 2. 
 
Under new section 486, the term "derivative financial instrument" would include 
any option, forward contract, futures contract, short position, swap, or similar 
financial instrument. The term "notional principal contract" means any financial 
instrument that requires two or more payments at specified intervals calculated 
by reference to a specified index up one or more notional principal amounts. An 
amount will not fail to be treated as a payment merely because that amount is 
fixed on one date and paid or otherwise taken into account on a different date. 
The term "specified index" means any one or combination of (a) a rate, price, or 
amount (whether fixed or variable); (b) any index based on any information 
(including the occurrence or non-occurrence of any event) that is not within the 
control of any of the parties to the instrument and is not unique to any of the 
parties' circumstances; and (c) any other index as the Treasury secretary may 
prescribe. Interestingly, weighing in on an important issue, the technical 
explanation states that it is intended that a credit default swap be treated as a 
derivative either because it represents an option on a debt instrument or because 
it qualifies as a NPC. 
 
The definition of derivative contains limitations on the rules' applicability to real 
property. An interest or instrument is not a derivative if it is either (1) on a track 
of real property as defined in section 1237(c) or (2) only on real property that 
would be inventory or if held directly by the taxpayer. With those modifications, 
as revised, section 475 would apply only to shares of stock in a corporation; 
partnership or beneficial ownership interests in a widely held or publicly traded 
partnership or trust; and notes, bonds, debentures, or other evidence of 
indebtedness. One noteworthy aspect of section 485 is that it would apply to 
                                                 
10 Source: The financial product tax reform proposals (Connors 2013). 
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derivatives on stock even if such stock is not actively traded, whereas it would 
apply to commodities only if they are actively traded. For section 475 dealers, 
that aspect is not troubling because of the nature of dealer business. For other 
taxpayers, however, subjecting derivatives on non-marketable stock to mark-to-
market treatment is problematic. Moreover, the provision applies not only to 
derivatives but also to an "interest in" stock, so it literally applies to contractual 
rights regarding stocks. 
 
A noteworthy point is that the mark-to-market rules will apply to the non-
derivative that is part of a mixed straddle -- a term that will be introduced in new 
section 485. A straddle is defined as in section 1092(c), without the exception for 
identified straddles. Under a coordination rule, the current-law exception from 
the straddle rules for qualified covered calls would be eliminated. Mixed straddles 
are straddles consisting of non-derivatives. However, the rules do not apply 
evenly. Built-in gain is recognized when the mixed straddle is created, but loss is 
deferred. This feature may be the most controversial part of the proposal. 
Because of the broad scope of the provision, it would apply to simple transactions 
like the sale of a covered call or the purchase of a put. 
 
The proposal contains some limited guidance on valuation. When there is no 
readily ascertainable fair market value, FMV is to be determined under the 
method used for purposes of a report or statement to shareholders, partners, or 
other proprietors, beneficiaries, other persons as the secretary may specify, or for 
credit purposes. For terminations, valuation will take place upon the termination. 
No blockage can be considered in the determination of value. For convertible debt 
instruments with an embedded derivative, the valuation of the embedded 
derivative component is determined based on the debt instrument with and 
without the component. 
 
2. The administration proposals. Two Obama administration proposals 
address financial product reform. The administration's 2014 budget proposals 
would also include a mark-to-market provision, although it would be much more 
limited than the Camp proposal. A derivative contract would be broadly defined 
to include (1) any contract whose value is determined, directly or indirectly, in 
whole or in part, by the value of actively traded property; and (2) any contract 
regarding a contract described in category (1). A derivative contract embedded in 
another financial instrument or contract would be subject to mark-to-market if 
the derivative by itself would be marked to market. Further, a financial 
instrument that is not otherwise marked to market that is part of (or becomes 
part of) a straddle transaction with a derivative contract would be marked to 
market, with pre-existing gain recognized at that time and loss recognized when 
the financial instrument would have been recognized in the absence of the 
straddle. 
 
The administration's 2013 budget proposal would have been narrower. It would 
have required dealers in commodities, commodities derivatives, securities, and 
options to treat the income from their day-to-day dealer activities in section 1256 
contracts as ordinary in character, not capital. The proposal would have applied 





Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th Pctl 75th Pctl 
ETR 13,728 0.230 0.254 0.208 0.161 0.357 
GAAP 13,728 0.228 0.237 0.216 0.139 0.345 
CURR 13,728 0.195 0.174 0.206 0.122 0.307 
CASH 13,728 0.176 0.132 0.205 0.106 0.280 
FVAPER 13,728 0.137 0.030 0.213 0.002 0.188 
AL1 13,728 0.082 0.008 0.153 0.000 0.092 
AL2 13,728 0.048 0.001 0.122 0.000 0.018 
AL3 13,728 0.006 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 
FVLPER 13,728 0.029 0.001 0.089 0.000 0.010 
LL1 13,728 0.004 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 
LL2 13,728 0.015 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.003 
LL3 13,728 0.006 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 
ROA 13,728 0.010 0.052 0.213 -0.027 0.116 
LEVERAGE 13,728 0.213 0.159 0.230 0.002 0.328 
NOL 13,728 0.547 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
NOL_CHANGE 13,728 0.039 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.006 
FI 13,728 0.015 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.023 
PPE 13,728 0.272 0.173 0.269 0.073 0.384 
INTANG 13,728 0.212 0.127 0.234 0.015 0.351 
EQINC 13,728 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 13,728 6.804 0.917 18.353 0.228 3.936 
MB 13,728 2.698 1.895 3.832 1.138 3.338 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the full sample with 13,728 firm-year 
observations. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 




Table 2: Pearson Correlations 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
ETR 1.00 
                     GAAP 0.69 1.00 
                    CURR 0.45 0.54 1.00 
                   CASH 0.34 0.37 0.64 1.00 
                  FVAPER -0.21 -0.19 -0.14 -0.15 1.00 
                 AL1 -0.17 -0.15 -0.11 -0.11 0.80 1.00 
                AL2 -0.12 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 0.63 0.08 1.00 
               AL3 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.19 0.08 0.01 1.00 
              FVLPER -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.00 1.00 
             LL1 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.54 1.00 
            LL2 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.74 0.11 1.00 
           LL3 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.42 0.01 0.01 1.00 
          ROA 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.29 -0.28 -0.28 -0.09 -0.04 -0.15 0.03 -0.02 -0.31 1.00 
         LEVERAGE 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.27 -0.22 -0.17 -0.05 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.01 0.03 1.00 
        NOL -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.06 1.00 
       NOL_CHANGE -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 -0.14 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 -0.43 0.01 0.11 1.00 
      FI 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.11 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.32 -0.04 0.02 -0.10 1.00 
     PPE 0.05 0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.31 -0.25 -0.20 -0.04 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.06 0.12 0.36 -0.12 -0.07 -0.07 1.00 
    INTANG 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.11 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.27 0.10 -0.04 0.09 -0.30 1.00 
   EQINC 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 1.00 
  SIZE 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.16 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.12 1.00 
 MB -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.14 0.12 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.05 1.00 
This table reports Pearson correlations among variables for the full sample. A correlation coefficient in bold indicates that the correlation is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Table 3: Association between Fair Value Assets and Tax Aggressiveness 
 
ETR GAAP CURR CASH 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FVAPER -0.064*** -0.054* -0.087*** -0.070*** 
 
(-2.60) (-1.69) (-4.00) (-3.48) 
FVLPER -0.005 0.031 0.048 0.047 
 
(-0.09) (0.38) (1.04) (1.18) 
ROA 0.255*** 0.333*** 0.284*** 0.256*** 
 
(13.86) (9.97) (17.20) (15.93) 
LEVERAGE -0.098*** -0.174*** -0.155*** -0.125*** 
 
(-3.52) (-4.66) (-4.07) (-3.60) 
NOL -0.031*** -0.027** -0.036*** -0.032*** 
 
(-2.97) (-2.06) (-3.37) (-2.90) 
NOL_CHANGE 0.008 0.038 0.027* 0.016 
 
(0.37) (1.34) (1.95) (0.96) 
FI 0.656*** 0.350** 0.416*** 0.339*** 
 
(5.83) (2.58) (4.43) (3.63) 
PPE 0.039 0.021 -0.106*** -0.107*** 
 
(1.15) (0.41) (-3.52) (-4.26) 
INTANG 0.098*** 0.017 0.038* 0.069*** 
 
(3.21) (0.36) (1.67) (2.85) 
EQINC -3.335*** -0.640 -2.413*** -1.389 
 
(-3.62) (-0.51) (-2.89) (-1.56) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(3.54) (2.16) (4.52) (3.64) 
MB 0.001 0.002 0.001* 0.001 
 
(0.57) (1.22) (1.74) (1.19) 
Constant 0.114*** 0.266*** 0.204*** 0.187*** 
 
(4.78) (8.03) (13.58) (9.25) 
Year Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Industry Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Adjusted R-squared  0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 
Observations        13,728        13,728        13,728        13,728 
This table reports estimation results of the association between fair value assets and tax aggressiveness. 
The dependent variable is one of the four measures of tax aggressiveness (ETR, GAAP, CURR, and CASH). 
FVAPER is fair value assets as a percentage of total assets. FVLPER is fair value liabilities as a percentage 
of total assets. All regression models control for year and industry fixed effects. The reported t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 4: Fair Value Hierarchy of FAS No. 157 and Tax Aggressiveness 
 ETR GAAP CURR CASH 
 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
AL1 -0.026 -0.010 -0.048** -0.010 
 
(-0.92) (-0.28) (-2.03) (-0.40) 
AL2 -0.099*** -0.111*** -0.124*** -0.147*** 
 
(-2.98) (-2.68) (-3.76) (-5.24) 
AL3 -0.468*** -0.321* -0.441*** -0.361** 
 
(-2.85) (-1.66) (-2.79) (-2.39) 
FVLPER -0.005 0.029 0.048 0.044 
 
(-0.09) (0.36) (1.04) (1.14) 
ROA 0.259*** 0.338*** 0.288*** 0.263*** 
 
(14.12) (10.11) (17.50) (16.27) 
LEVERAGE -0.098*** -0.173*** -0.155*** -0.125*** 
 
(-3.54) (-4.66) (-4.09) (-3.60) 
NOL -0.031*** -0.027** -0.036*** -0.032*** 
 
(-2.99) (-2.09) (-3.40) (-2.95) 
NOL_CHANGE 0.008 0.037 0.027* 0.015 
 
(0.36) (1.33) (1.94) (0.91) 
FI 0.653*** 0.348** 0.413*** 0.336*** 
 
(5.82) (2.56) (4.43) (3.61) 
PPE 0.038 0.019 -0.107*** -0.109*** 
 
(1.12) (0.37) (-3.57) (-4.37) 
INTANG 0.097*** 0.015 0.038* 0.067*** 
 
(3.18) (0.32) (1.66) (2.81) 
EQINC -3.328*** -0.658 -2.407*** -1.415 
 
(-3.65) (-0.52) (-2.91) (-1.59) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(3.62) (2.22) (4.63) (3.80) 
MB 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.46) (1.17) (1.59) (1.05) 
Constant 0.119*** 0.267*** 0.207*** 0.190*** 
 
(5.04) (8.07) (13.88) (9.51) 
Year Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Industry Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 
Observations        13,728        13,728        13,728        13,728 
AL1 = AL2 (F-stat) 4.23** 4.77** 4.56** 17.62*** 
p-value 0.040 0.029 0.033 0.000 
AL2 = AL3 (F-stat) 5.28** 1.21 4.21** 2.15 
p-value 0.022 0.272 0.040 0.143 
AL1 = AL3 (F-stat) 7.25*** 2.63* 6.24** 5.25** 
p-value 0.007 0.100 0.013 0.022 
This table reports estimation results of the association between assets from different levels of fair value 
hierarchy and tax aggressiveness. The dependent variable is one of the four measures of tax aggressiveness 
(ETR, GAAP, CURR, and CASH). AL1, AL2, and AL3 are Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets as a 
percentage of total assets, respectively. FVLPER is fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. All 
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regression models control for year and industry fixed effects. The reported t-statistics in parentheses are 
based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variables are defined in Appendix A.      
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Table 5: The Impact of Corporate Governance on Fair Value Hierarchy and Tax Aggressiveness 
  ETR GAAP CURR CASH 
 Poor CG Good CG Poor CG Good CG Poor CG Good CG Poor CG Good CG 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AL1 -0.016 0.034 0.006 0.010 -0.062 0.019 -0.060 0.046 
 
(-0.30) (0.88) (0.09) (0.20) (-1.28) (0.66) (-1.23) (1.48) 
AL2 -0.082 0.015 -0.095 -0.010 -0.078* -0.016 -0.099** -0.031 
 
(-1.27) (0.30) (-1.36) (-0.13) (-1.84) (-0.23) (-2.56) (-0.66) 
AL3 -0.741* 0.010 -0.715* -0.078 -0.436** -0.045 -0.422** -0.137 
 
(-1.84) (0.07) (-1.64) (-0.59) (-2.31) (-0.30) (-2.36) (-1.04) 
FVLPER -0.006 -0.050 -0.054 -0.004 -0.017 0.044 -0.001 0.079 
 
(-0.05) (-0.56) (-0.38) (-0.04) (-0.27) (0.71) (-0.03) (1.60) 
ROA 0.259*** 0.158*** 0.254*** 0.178*** 0.290*** 0.224*** 0.234*** 0.202*** 
 
(7.09) (5.66) (4.13) (4.85) (9.16) (9.70) (8.01) (9.22) 
LEVERAGE -0.107*** -0.065 -0.115** -0.107* -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.070** -0.098*** 
 
(-2.69) (-1.43) (-2.14) (-1.68) (-2.82) (-2.64) (-2.49) (-2.97) 
NOL -0.023 -0.020 -0.039* -0.032 -0.033** -0.020 -0.019 -0.005 
 
(-1.31) (-1.19) (-1.78) (-1.42) (-2.47) (-1.36) (-1.49) (-0.34) 
NOL_CHANGE 0.017 -0.025 0.042 0.046 0.022 0.037 -0.009 -0.005 
 
(0.44) (-0.71) (0.80) (1.20) (0.84) (1.64) (-0.49) (-0.23) 
FI 0.661*** 0.788*** 0.429* 0.684*** 0.380** 0.588*** 0.388** 0.305** 
 
(3.03) (4.25) (1.69) (2.90) (2.12) (3.88) (2.09) (1.98) 
PPE 0.071 0.056 0.020 0.037 -0.112*** -0.055 -0.088** -0.043 
 
(1.49) (1.23) (0.29) (0.57) (-2.93) (-1.59) (-2.46) (-1.35) 
INTANG 0.116** 0.027 0.067 -0.033 0.006 0.010 -0.004 0.050 
 
(2.31) (0.59) (1.05) (-0.50) (0.17) (0.26) (-0.12) (1.35) 
EQINC -2.707 -2.284* 0.287 0.978 -1.191 -2.170* -1.719 -1.147 
 
(-1.12) (-1.68) (0.12) (0.51) (-0.92) (-1.69) (-1.17) (-0.99) 
SIZE 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 
(0.30) (4.53) (1.67) (1.76) (1.93) (6.09) (2.43) (3.37) 
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MB 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.29) (-0.27) (-0.35) (-0.54) (1.42) (0.85) (0.19) (0.60) 
Constant 0.160*** 0.109*** 0.210*** 0.240** 0.255*** 0.143*** 0.229*** 0.118*** 
 
(4.83) (3.72) (4.48) (2.38) (9.79) (5.98) (8.46) (5.25) 
Year Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Industry Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Observations          3,587          3,830          3,587          3,830          3,587          3,830          3,587          3,830 
AL1 = AL2 (F-stat) 1.14 0.11 1.82 0.06 0.10 0.25 0.67 2.29 
p-value 0.287 0.740 0.177 0.809 0.758 0.618 0.414 0.130 
AL2 = AL3 (F-stat) 2.8* 0.00 2.17 0.22 3.42* 0.03 3.21* 0.59 
p-value 0.095 0.976 0.141 0.638 0.065 0.857 0.073 0.441 
AL1 = AL3 (F-stat) 3.16* 0.02 2.62 0.44 3.50* 0.18 3.79* 1.82 
p-value 0.075 0.877 0.106 0.506 0.061 0.671 0.052 0.178 
This table reports estimation results for the impact of corporate governance on the association between assets from different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax 
aggressiveness. Higher CG represents worse corporate governance. Firms are classified into poor corporate governance group (poor CG) if they are in the upper 
quartile or into good corporate governance group (good CG) if they are in the lower quartile of each year. The dependent variable is one of the four measures of tax 
aggressiveness (ETR, GAAP, CURR, and CASH). AL1, AL2, and AL3 are Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets as a percentage of total assets, respectively. 
FVLPER is fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. All regression models control for year and industry fixed effects. The reported t-statistics in parentheses 
are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 




Table 6: The Impact of Product Market Power on Fair Value Hierarchy and Tax Aggressiveness 
  ETR GAAP CURR CASH 
 High PCM Low PCM High PCM Low PCM High PCM Low PCM High PCM Low PCM 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AL1 -0.084* -0.002 -0.026 -0.005 -0.057 -0.046 0.006 -0.028 
 
(-1.85) (-0.05) (-0.41) (-0.11) (-1.45) (-1.60) (0.17) (-0.89) 
AL2 -0.143*** -0.068 -0.180*** -0.070 -0.176*** -0.091** -0.152*** -0.140*** 
 
(-2.64) (-1.59) (-2.59) (-1.32) (-3.05) (-2.37) (-3.63) (-3.96) 
AL3 -0.830*** -0.168 -0.442 -0.124 -0.793** -0.142 -0.799*** -0.050 
 
(-2.59) (-1.01) (-1.19) (-0.70) (-2.43) (-1.12) (-2.82) (-0.35) 
FVLPER -0.059 0.093 -0.001 0.078 0.087 0.030 0.105 -0.010 
 
(-0.65) (1.36) (-0.01) (0.79) (1.08) (0.62) (1.55) (-0.23) 
ROA 0.318*** 0.182*** 0.543*** 0.197*** 0.341*** 0.212*** 0.261*** 0.211*** 
 
(9.50) (7.22) (6.72) (5.31) (11.50) (10.39) (8.20) (10.81) 
LEVERAGE -0.149*** -0.029 -0.236*** -0.064 -0.203*** -0.075*** -0.199*** -0.044 
 
(-4.39) (-0.77) (-5.01) (-1.24) (-4.00) (-2.58) (-4.31) (-1.49) 
NOL -0.044*** -0.005 -0.015 -0.022 -0.047*** -0.013 -0.049*** -0.005 
 
(-2.97) (-0.36) (-0.87) (-1.21) (-2.90) (-1.13) (-2.90) (-0.42) 
NOL_CHANGE 0.037 -0.018 0.108 -0.004 0.055* 0.006 0.053 -0.005 
 
(0.61) (-0.77) (1.28) (-0.15) (1.70) (0.38) (1.45) (-0.28) 
FI 0.418*** 0.841*** 0.157 0.522** 0.028 0.794*** -0.025 0.670*** 
 
(2.76) (4.72) (0.89) (2.25) (0.22) (5.13) (-0.22) (4.09) 
PPE 0.003 0.058 0.032 0.004 -0.157*** -0.054 -0.123*** -0.080** 
 
(0.05) (1.46) (0.39) (0.08) (-3.42) (-1.50) (-3.40) (-2.32) 
INTANG 0.040 0.124*** -0.066 0.095* 0.015 0.040 0.067** 0.044 
 
(0.95) (2.72) (-1.00) (1.74) (0.47) (1.17) (2.01) (1.25) 
EQINC -4.621*** -1.072 -2.045 2.720 -3.318*** -1.287 -1.873 -1.206 
 
(-3.85) (-0.80) (-1.39) (1.24) (-2.96) (-1.04) (-1.64) (-1.02) 
SIZE 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** 
 
(2.54) (2.18) (1.50) (1.39) (2.82) (4.99) (1.93) (5.58) 
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MB 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.01) (0.24) (-0.04) (1.12) (1.54) (0.82) (1.58) (0.04) 
Constant 0.170*** 0.068** 0.036 0.121*** 0.256*** 0.151*** 0.229*** 0.139*** 
 
(4.36) (2.56) (0.55) (3.08) (12.35) (6.91) (8.14) (4.84) 
Year Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Industry Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.06 
Observations          6,537          6,535          6,537          6,535          6,537          6,535          6,537          6,535 
AL1 = AL2 (F-stat) 0.97  2.15 4.41** 1.27 4.15** 1.03 9.01*** 8.08*** 
p-value 0.326 0.143 0.036 0.260 0.042 0.311 0.003 0.005 
AL2 = AL3 (F-stat) 5.05** 0.35 0.53 0.08 3.79* 0.15 5.85**  0.37 
p-value 0.025 0.556 0.466 0.771 0.052 0.698 0.016 0.542 
AL1 = AL3 (F-stat) 5.52** 0.98 1.32 0.43 5.09** 0.55 7.65*** 0.02 
p-value 0.019 0.323 0.251 0.512 0.024 0.457 0.006 0.879 
This table reports estimation results for the impact of product market power on the association between assets from different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax 
aggressiveness. Firms are classified into high or low product market power group based on the median value of price-cost margin (PCM) of each year. The dependent 
variable is one of the four measures of tax aggressiveness (ETR, GAAP, CURR, and CASH). AL1, AL2, and AL3 are Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets as a 
percentage of total assets, respectively. FVLPER is fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. All regression models control for year and industry fixed effects. 
The reported t-statistics in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 




Table 7: The Impact of Geographic Dispersion on Fair Value Hierarchy and Tax Aggressiveness 
  ETR GAAP CURR CASH 
 
High GD Low GD High GD Low GD High GD Low GD High GD Low GD 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AL1 0.006 -0.101** 0.023 -0.102* -0.032 -0.087** 0.003 -0.029 
 
(0.17) (-2.11) (0.47) (-1.71) (-1.01) (-2.53) (0.08) (-0.77) 
AL2 -0.101** -0.100* -0.113* -0.128** -0.109** -0.137*** -0.179*** -0.091** 
 
(-2.31) (-1.90) (-1.95) (-2.13) (-2.31) (-3.12) (-4.29) (-2.53) 
AL3 -0.727*** -0.177 -0.618* -0.011 -0.689*** -0.162 -0.681*** 0.004 
 
(-2.69) (-1.05) (-1.92) (-0.05) (-2.65) (-1.23) (-2.91) (0.03) 
FVLPER 0.018 -0.004 -0.040 0.154 0.101 0.022 0.053 0.049 
 
(0.23) (-0.05) (-0.39) (1.15) (1.30) (0.41) (0.81) (1.05) 
ROA 0.249*** 0.275*** 0.288*** 0.396*** 0.291*** 0.292*** 0.275*** 0.252*** 
 
(9.87) (10.13) (7.62) (7.02) (12.00) (12.59) (11.10) (11.09) 
LEVERAGE -0.091** -0.088** -0.114** -0.227*** -0.181*** -0.115*** -0.146*** -0.097*** 
 
(-2.44) (-2.45) (-2.44) (-3.61) (-3.19) (-4.47) (-2.80) (-3.69) 
NOL -0.041*** -0.015 -0.039** -0.014 -0.039*** -0.029*** -0.030** -0.027** 
 
(-2.97) (-1.12) (-2.36) (-0.74) (-2.74) (-2.77) (-2.00) (-2.41) 
NOL_CHANGE -0.009 0.025 0.038 0.040 0.028 0.018 0.019 0.002 
 
(-0.32) (0.70) (1.10) (0.82) (1.41) (0.93) (0.80) (0.13) 
FI 0.728*** 0.705*** 0.557*** -0.059 0.422*** 0.479** 0.333*** 0.460** 
 
(5.37) (2.79) (3.25) (-0.20) (3.50) (2.45) (2.82) (2.43) 
PPE -0.036 0.090** -0.099 0.130* -0.138** -0.079*** -0.160*** -0.058* 
 
(-0.65) (2.12) (-1.28) (1.75) (-2.54) (-2.64) (-3.75) (-1.93) 
INTANG 0.076* 0.110** 0.040 -0.033 0.059 0.011 0.056 0.084** 
 
(1.83) (2.29) (0.76) (-0.44) (1.64) (0.39) (1.61) (2.49) 
EQINC -3.442*** -3.655*** -0.923 0.431 -3.291*** -1.968** -1.268 -2.294* 
 
(-2.73) (-2.80) (-0.55) (0.22) (-2.76) (-2.00) (-0.98) (-1.86) 
SIZE 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(3.54) (1.57) (0.64) (2.71) (3.43) (3.41) (2.69) (2.96) 
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MB 0.002* -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.003** 
 
(1.71) (-0.82) (0.74) (0.88) (1.24) (0.90) (-0.53) (2.55) 
Constant 0.090** 0.160*** 0.095* 0.069 0.172*** 0.250*** 0.184*** 0.195*** 
 
(2.48) (5.68) (1.94) (1.15) (7.94) (11.76) (6.01) (7.49) 
Year Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Industry Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Observations          5,867          5,861          5,867          5,861          5,867          5,861          5,867          5,861 
AL1 = AL2 (F-stat) 5.32** 0.00 4.92** 0.13  2.40 0.95 13.06*** 2.30 
p-value 0.021 0.990 0.027 0.717 0.122 0.330 0.000 0.130 
AL2 = AL3 (F-stat) 5.55** 0.23 2.52 0.34 5.25** 0.03 5.01** 0.39 
p-value 0.019 0.634 0.112 0.561 0.022 0.855 0.025 0.531 
AL1 = AL3 (F-stat) 7.44*** 0.19 4.14** 0.18  6.47** 0.30 8.25*** 0.04 
p-value 0.006 0.662 0.042 0.675 0.011 0.583 0.004 0.832 
This table reports estimation results for the impact of geographic dispersion on the association between assets from different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax 
aggressiveness. Firms are classified into high or low geographic dispersion group based on the median value of geographic dispersion (GD) of each year. The dependent 
variable is one of the four measures of tax aggressiveness (ETR, GAAP, CURR, and CASH). AL1, AL2, and AL3 are Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets as a 
percentage of total assets, respectively. FVLPER is fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. All regression models control for year and industry fixed effects. 
The reported t-statistics in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 






Table 8: The Impact of Financial Constraint on Fair Value Hierarchy and Tax Aggressiveness 
  ETR GAAP CURR CASH 
 High SA Low SA High SA Low SA High SA Low SA High SA Low SA 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
AL1 -0.026 -0.057 -0.003 -0.093 -0.043* -0.062 0.003 -0.011 
 
(-0.85) (-0.80) (-0.07) (-0.90) (-1.70) (-1.08) (0.13) (-0.17) 
AL2 -0.122*** -0.058 -0.144*** -0.106 -0.122*** -0.152*** -0.134*** -0.215*** 
 
(-3.00) (-0.90) (-2.61) (-1.22) (-2.93) (-2.68) (-3.76) (-4.31) 
AL3 -0.982** -0.527 -0.921* -0.214 -1.095*** -1.048 -1.202*** -0.399 
 
(-2.51) (-0.78) (-1.89) (-0.21) (-2.82) (-1.59) (-2.72) (-0.77) 
FVLPER -0.001 -0.002 0.038 0.085 0.012 0.081 0.006 0.114 
 
(-0.02) (-0.02) (0.44) (0.40) (0.23) (1.13) (0.14) (1.43) 
ROA 0.229*** 0.385*** 0.280*** 0.655*** 0.253*** 0.388*** 0.223*** 0.419*** 
 
(12.74) (6.80) (8.71) (4.22) (15.24) (6.67) (14.63) (5.92) 
LEVERAGE -0.056* -0.174*** -0.149*** -0.232** -0.161*** -0.115*** -0.144*** -0.069 
 
(-1.80) (-3.09) (-3.59) (-2.23) (-3.42) (-2.60) (-3.31) (-1.60) 
NOL -0.029** -0.028 -0.028* -0.004 -0.042*** -0.019 -0.041*** -0.013 
 
(-2.31) (-1.59) (-1.73) (-0.12) (-3.13) (-1.21) (-2.92) (-0.77) 
NOL_CHANGE 0.008 -0.049 0.015 0.162 0.016 0.109* 0.016 -0.002 
 
(0.49) (-0.35) (0.59) (1.08) (1.29) (1.84) (1.15) (-0.03) 
FI 0.707*** 0.278 0.464*** -0.123 0.588*** -0.051 0.538*** -0.184 
 
(5.88) (1.18) (2.84) (-0.40) (5.02) (-0.34) (4.65) (-1.16) 
PPE -0.011 0.104* -0.064 0.213* -0.154*** -0.022 -0.108*** -0.117*** 
 
(-0.28) (1.68) (-1.06) (1.79) (-4.04) (-0.52) (-3.37) (-2.65) 
INTANG 0.122*** 0.035 0.022 -0.038 0.038 0.037 0.100*** 0.037 
 
(3.71) (0.60) (0.44) (-0.33) (1.34) (0.91) (3.32) (0.76) 
EQINC -2.643** -4.195** -1.139 1.467 -2.722*** -2.262 -2.314** 0.091 
 
(-2.57) (-2.52) (-0.82) (0.45) (-2.71) (-1.26) (-2.08) (0.05) 
SIZE 0.000* 0.001*** 0.000 0.002* 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(1.73) (2.61) (1.44) (1.80) (2.95) (4.31) (2.99) (2.92) 
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MB 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.007* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
(0.68) (-0.92) (-0.09) (1.80) (1.43) (0.34) (0.76) (0.95) 
Constant 0.101*** 0.209*** 0.100* -0.024 0.200*** 0.233*** 0.170*** 0.215*** 
 
(3.39) (6.33) (1.94) (-0.28) (10.91) (7.10) (6.44) (5.91) 
Year Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Industry Indicators           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 
Observations          3,677          3,678          3,677          3,678          3,677          3,678          3,677          3,678 
AL1 = AL2 (F-stat) 5.28** 0.00 6.18** 0.01  3.46* 1.39 12.07*** 8.40*** 
p-value 0.022 0.995 0.013 0.918 0.063 0.239 0.001 0.004 
AL2 = AL3 (F-stat) 5.02** 0.47  2.62 0.01 6.55** 1.80 6.04**  0.12 
p-value 0.025 0.495 0.105 0.920 0.011 0.180 0.014 0.726 
AL1 = AL3 (F-stat) 6.00** 0.48 3.65* 0.01 7.42*** 2.21  7.32***  0.55 
p-value 0.014 0.487 0.056 0.908 0.007 0.137 0.007 0.460 
This table reports estimation results for the impact of financial constraint on the association between assets from different levels of fair value hierarchy and tax 
aggressiveness. Firms are classified into high or low financial constraint group based on the median value of size-age index (SA) of each year. The dependent variable 
is one of the four measures of tax aggressiveness (ETR, GAAP, CURR, and CASH). AL1, AL2, and AL3 are Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets as a 
percentage of total assets, respectively. FVLPER is fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. All regression models control for year and industry fixed effects. 
The reported t-statistics in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 








VARIABLES (1) (2) 
AL1 0.021 -0.015 
 
(1.10) (-0.70) 
AL2 0.095*** 0.055** 
 
(3.85) (2.15) 
AL3 0.408** 0.354** 
 
(2.55) (2.20) 





















































Constant 0.056*** 0.081*** 
 
(6.18) (6.70) 
Year Indicators                      Yes                       Yes 
Industry Indicators                      Yes                       Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.02 0.05 
Observations                   13,728                  13,728 
AL1 = AL2 (F-stat) 5.65** 5.03** 
p-value 0.018 0.025 
AL2 = AL3 (F-stat) 3.73* 3.38* 
p-value 0.054 0.066 
AL1 = AL3 (F-stat) 5.66** 5.13** 
p-value 0.017 0.024 
This table reports estimation results of the association between assets from different levels of fair value 
hierarchy and the amount spent on tax lobbying. The dependent variable is tax lobbying expenditure, 
defined as a firm's reported lobbying expenditure for tax purposes divided by lagged total assets (LOBBY). 
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AL1, AL2, and AL3 are Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets as a percentage of total assets, 
respectively. FVLPER is fair value liabilities as a percentage of total assets. All regression models control 
for year and industry fixed effects. The reported t-statistics in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
